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Abstract 
Internet of Things (IoT) provides the possibility for milliards of 
devices throughout the world to communicate with each other, and 
data is collected autonomously. The big data generated by the devices 
should be managed securely. Due to security challenges, like 
malicious nodes, many approaches cannot respond to these concerns. 
In this paper, a robust hybrid method, including encryption, is used as 
an efficient approach for resolving the RPL protocol concerns so that 
the devices are connected securely. Therefore, the proposed DSH-
RPL method for securing the RPL protocol comprises the four 
following phases: The first phase creates a reliable RPL. The second 
phase detects the sinkhole attack. The third phase quarantines the 
detected malicious node, and the fourth phase transmits data through 
encryption. The simulation results show that the DSH-RPL reduces 
the false-positive rate more than 18.2% and 23.1%, and reduces the 
false-negative rate more than 16.1% and 22.78%, it also increases the 
packet delivery rate more than 19.68% and 25.32% and increases the 
detection rate more than 26% and 31% compared to SecTrust-RPL 
and IBOOS-RPL. 
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1     INTRODUCTION 
IoT, which is known as the fourth industrial revolution, connects various physical devices, smart 
counters, wireless thermometers and smart vehicles, and has developed various technologies in the 
human society using new and modern methods, in which each object can receive and transmit data 
via communication networks, including the Internet [1]. Security in information exchange is a 
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technology and its widespread use due to easy and fast implementation and low cost compared to the 
implementation of the network's physical platform and security shortcomings in this technology and 
possibility of malicious attacks and phishing, necessitates presenting approaches to handle these 
attacks [2]. Therefore, considering the nature of the IoT ecosystem's wireless technology, which has 
many vulnerabilities, considering the weak points and trying to resolve them might speed up using 
this ecosystem. Security in IoT, like other networks, is based on confidentiality and trust. Thus, 
attack detection systems are one of the primary defense methods against attacks in IoT. One of the 
dangerous attacks in IoT is the sinkhole attack. The Sinkhole is one of the most dangerous attacks 
that operate in the network layer of the protocol stack. In this attack, the malicious node tries to 
attract the network traffic by broadcasting fraud routing information and then it does not forward the 
packets.   
     Therefore, this study's main contribution in resolving the above problems and making 
communications among IoT devices secure is to introduce a secure method based on ranking and 
encryption to solve the mentioned concerns. Thus, in this paper, a method is presented that solves 
the above problem in the following four steps:  
Step 1: The first phase creates a reliable RPL.  
Step 2: The second phase detects the sinkhole attack.  
Step 3: The third phase quarantines the detected malicious node,  
Step 4: and the fourth phase transmits data through encryption. 
 
     The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II reviews the research background on 
securing communication between devices. Section III discusses the proposed DSH-RPL in detail. 
Section IV deals with the simulation and performance evaluation of the proposed method. Finally, 
Section V concludes the paper. 
 
 
2 SINKHOLE ATTACKS AND DETECTION APPROACHES 
This section explains the concepts of sinkhole attack and detection approaches. 
 
2.1   SINKHOLE ATTACK 
The sinkhole is one of the most dangerous attacks in IoT networks, which takes place in the network 
layer of the protocol stack and prevents the packets from reaching the destination. In a sinkhole 
attack, the intruders aim to absorb the total traffic by a node originating from one region. Since the 
nodes are close to or along the route along which the packets travel, the chance that the packets can 
be accessed is very high. Sinkhole attacks can be a means for other attacks (selective forwarding). 
Sinkhole attacks are usually performed by a node, which is more attractive than other nodes 
concerning the routing algorithm. One motivation for the sinkhole attack might be the selective 
forwarding attack. Since the total traffic streams from one node, an intruder can omit or manipulate 
the packets originating from all nodes of a specific region. Figure 1 shows a sinkhole attack in an 
IoT ecosystem. 
 
FIGURE 1 Sinkhole attack in IoT. 
 
2.2   Detection approaches 
A large number of studies have been conducted on securing communication between IoT devices. 
According to the subject matter of the present research, several prominent studies performed in this 
domain will be reviewed and evaluated. 
     In [3], a method has been presented for detecting the malicious nodes in IoT. This hybrid intrusion 
detection model is used to detect the malicious operations of "selective forwarding" and "sinkhole 
attack" based on the 6LOWPAN protocol. 
     In [4], the proposed defensive approach includes the following:  
1. The average energy consumption and memory usage (RAM) are saved significantly.  
2. The proposed method reduces the number of IDSs without threatening their efficiency.  
3. The proposed method is based on the 6LoWPAN and employs the local knowledge, which makes 
it scalable and distributed. 
4. The proposed method maximizes the true positive rate and the true negative rate.  
 
    In [5], the Blockchain Lightweight Scalable (LBS) has been proposed, which has been optimized 
for IoT requirements and in the meantime, ensures end-to-end security. The proposed blockchain has 
established an overlay network on which the devices that jointly control blockchain management along 
with the upper resource may achieve a distributed mechanism. The overlay network has been 
organized to reduce principal costs as certain clusters and cluster-heads are responsible for public 
chain management. This method utilizes a distributed trust mechanism exploited by cluster-heads to 
diminish data processing overload gradually for verifying new blocks. 
    A secure method has been presented in [6] to develop an efficient IDS for the IoT devices, including 
the following structure: The IDS is comprised of three sections: observation, analysis, and alarm. The 
proposed IDS is a detection method based on the anomaly, suitable for use in IoT. In this method, if an 
intrusion is detected, the IDS informs the users before the adversary attacks. Also, the proposed 
method can detect intrusion through observing the network and the connected devices. The proposed 
IDS detects the routing attacks that have not been detected before. Considering the method presented 
in this paper for preventing the active sinkhole attack, VoIP devices do not communicate directly so 
that fewer resources are consumed. The efficiency of the proposed method demonstrates that the 
computational overhead is reduced for all networks, reasonably. Also, its detection accuracy for 
routing attacks is high.   
     In [7], a distributed mechanism based on access control and authentication has been presented for 
IoT devices, which can be applied for different scenarios under certain conditions. It is based on the 
notion of “blockchain” and “fog computing technology”. Taking advantage of fog computing 
characteristics and the distributed nature of blockchain, a novel delay-sensitive mechanism with 
blockchain capabilities was proposed for IoT devices. The main contribution of this paper is the 
introduction of a decentralized mechanism that allows for the validation and access control to create a 
controlled and secure environment in which the devices communicate with secure information 
exchange. This communication can be established devices belonging to various systems or between 
identical devices. 
The method presented in [1] is based on a trust-aware RPL that can track and isolate the routing 
attacks with acceptable performance. The proposed method is called SecTrust-RPL, which is a routing 
protocol based on trust RPL, formulated based on the previously proposed framework of the authors, 
SecTrust.  
The innovations of this paper are as follows:  
1. This method validates the nodes.  
2. The proposed framework is based on the RPL routing protocol, which presents a new trust-
aware RPL protocol.  
3. The effectiveness of the SecTrust-RPL is compared with the standard RPL protocol through 
simulation under sinkhole attacks.  
4. Also, a real experiment is presented on the physical test platform for SecTrust-RPL to validate 
the simulation results.  
Authors of [8] have used the fuzzy logic to detect the malicious nodes in IoT and restricted their 
untrustworthy performance for network nodes. This method is based on clusters in the IoT network, 
fuzzy security protocol, and trust management via communication and secure message exchange 
among the IoT nodes. The proposed protocol employs a message system with serial communications 
for secure message encryption that allows the nodes to move securely from one cluster to another. 
    In [9], the aim is to give a detailed explanation of the mechanism of smart contracts and 
blockchains, as well as to identify pros and cons, whose introduction would lead to a robust system, 
highlighting blockchain and IoT application systems together. The existent devices on IoT devices can 
serve as points of contact with the physical world. When combined, these devices can ensure accurate 
encryption and significant cost and time savings during data processing. The authors have also 
maintained that reading this article allows the reader to detect potentially new applications of their 
IoT-related activities and make rational decisions when incorporating blockchain technology into their 
projects. 
     Authors of [10] have presented a new method that decreases the sinkhole attacks and prevents 
saturation issues. Therefore, the key role of this paper is as follows:  
1. SDELM model is used to provide IoT security and detect malicious attacks.  
2. A new reduction algorithm is presented, which is classified as approximate algorithms and 
has not been presented in previous studies.  
3. The newly proposed mechanism is tested in a real hardware network to evaluate its 
performance in practice.  
4. A set of experiments is executed using the UNB-ISCX measure data, and the results are 
compared with the existing approaches. 
     In [11], the authors have presented an equitable access framework. It has been earmarked for an 
IoT system that lets a number of individuals and institutions to access each other’s data. All members 
have been connected to the same blockchain network by which data access control has been 
performed. Every network member has a “purse” containing access information for the blockchain 
network members as well as all the keys to the information authorized to be observed. In such systems, 
if X requests a resource being processed by Y, the former must send its request along with all the 
corresponding keys to the blockchain network. Afterward, the blockchain network probes X’s access 
permission to Y’s resources. If X is permitted to receive the information, Y sends the data to that 
member. 
     In [12], a light penetration detection algorithm based on RPL protocol has been presented to defend 
Sybil and sinkhole attacks, which requires fewer computations, and its accuracy is high, which is 
essential in networks with limited resources. In the proposed method, all three types of Sybil attacks in 
stationary RPL and mobile RPL are studied, and a light penetration detection method is presented. The 
efficiency of the proposed algorithm is studied for all three types of Sybil attacks in terms of accuracy, 
sensitivity, and F-measure. Also, the authors have proposed a mathematical model inspired by nature 





3  PROPOSED DSH-RPL SCHEMA 
The presence of malicious nodes has always been a concern in all networks, particularly the IoT 
ecosystem. Various methods have been proposed to protect these networks. In IoT, due to the 
presence of malicious nodes like the Sinkhole attack, the trust measure among the nodes 
participating in routing is a significant issue. The purpose of this study is to introduce a method for 
routing in a trustworthy RPL in IoT technology that detects malicious sinkhole nodes. The proposed 
method, called DSH-RPL3, detects sinkhole attack in a trustworthy RPL. The proposed method is 
introduced in four phases. The first phase creates a trustworthy RPL, the second phase detects the 
sinkhole attacks, the third phase quarantines the detected malicious node, and finally, the fourth 
phase transmits data by encryption.  
   This paper is an improvement over a paper published by the authors of the same paper in [13], the 
differences between which are clarified as follows: 
• In our previous work [13], only malicious nodes were discovered based on rankings, but in 
the new work, the following changes have been applied: 
• The DODAG structure proposed in the new article is based on the Things reliability review, 
which is based on the criteria of energy, trust and honesty. This reliability and reliability 
review is an important and new topic, while in the previous article, the DODAG structure 
each of these steps was used without any review. 
 
3 Detection of sinkholes in RPL 
• In the previous article, only the rank difference was used in the malicious node detection 
step, but in the present article, this rank difference was used to create the DODAG tree, 
based on reliability and PDR, to more accurately detect the attack. 
• In the present paper, after removing the malicious node from the network to ensure data 




3.1   System Model of the Proposed Method 
The proposed IoT network is comprised of N IoT nodes with limited sources  1 2 3, , ,...,. nN N N N N= , 
which can be sensors or mobile objects. These nodes are in the network area with homogeneous 
sources. However, the sources might be heterogeneous depending on their operation; that is, they 
might have different infrastructure hardware or software. 
    RPL creates a virtual DODAG on the network topology. For experimental purposes, the presence 
of sinkhole malicious nodes is also considered. The root node plays an essential role in creating and 
preserving the balance of the existing network. The root node is a border router (BR2) that takes 
information from the object and transmits it to the CLOUD for processing. As mentioned in most 
studies, it is assumed that the root node (BR) is trustworthy and cannot be considered a malicious 
node. Other nodes of the network might be malicious, which should be detected and omitted from 
the routing process. Figure 2, shows the general schematic of the system model of the proposed 
DSH-RPL method. 
 
FIGURE 2 System Model of the proposed DSH-RPL method 
 
3.2   Phase 1: Developing a Trustworthy DODAG 
In the proposed method, the reliability among nodes is studied to develop the DODAG. To this end, 
several measures of each node, including energy, trust, and integrity, are investigated. These 
measures allow a node to communicate with trustworthy nodes only. However, as a result of this 
solution, the objects do not consume resources and cannot be assigned to IoT devices with limited 
energy resources, it is suggested that all computations are assigned to a TPM. The trustworthy 
platform module "TPM" is a small and low-cost security device aiming to execute the essential 
security services for a client machine. This hardware element keeps information like digital keys, 
certificates, and passwords securely. Such information is used to authenticate the platform. This 
process solves issues like signing messages, generating keys, and storage problems. Also, it can store 
the platform indices that help reliability [1].  
To create a reliable DODAG, TPM is used to secure the control messages through encryption. 
Before exchanging control messages, a trustworthy relationship is created among nodes. The 
switching exchange is done by RSA keys. Also, it is suggested to use TPM as a cooperator processor 
on a node for secure and safe transmission of computations and storage operation. The proposed 
DSH-RPL method is based on two complementary points: 
• It employs encryption-based methods and the authentication presented by TPM. These 
methods ensure trust among nodes for transmitting control messages.  
• The node behavior is investigated to ensure that the nodes participating in the creation and 
maintenance of the DODAG topology are trustworthy.  
 
3.2.1   Reliability of the Nodes 
To study network reliability and create a trustworthy DODAG, each node existing in any route of the 
network receives the reliability packet, REQP-R, generated by BR and inserts its information in the 
packet. Then, the node transmits the packet to its neighbors. Upon receiving this message from a 
node, the node’s ID is recorded in the monitoring table, and its trust field is increased by one unit 
(the initial value of the trust field is zero). The node has recorded information of the REQP-R packet, 
including the node's ID and energy of the node, and increases its trust field. The Trust field indicates 
that the node is not selfish and transmits the packets to the other nodes. Therefore, the node that 
transmits the REQP-R packet to other nodes is trustworthy. Upon receiving REQP-R, each node 
checks if the packet is repetitious or not (if the ID of the node is listed at the origin route). If so, the 
packet is discarded, but the trust field of the transmitter node is updated. Otherwise, the node inserts 
its information in the REQP-R packet and transmits it to its neighbors. Then, it transmits the ACK 
packet back to the BR. 
The trust field of a specific node is increased by the adjacent nodes whenever the node forwards the 
REQP_R packet, and its energy level is recorded in the monitoring table. The monitoring table is 
stored in the TPM of the node. 
Each node should transmit its information and its monitoring table to the node transmitting the 
REQP_R, through transmitting the ACK packet. According to this information and the monitoring 
table information, a node's being veridical is specified, and its veracity filed in the monitoring table 
is updated. This field shows if a node is veridical about the information of its neighboring nodes or 
not, through receiving ACKs and the monitoring table of the node, and comparison with other nodes. 
Thus, each node can gather more knowledge about the behavior of other nodes. The format of 
REQP_R packet is shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
1B 1B 2B 
Type code Checksum 
Node’s ID 
Energy 
Source IP address 
Source sequence number 
FIGURE 3 Format of REQP_R packet 
 
3.2.2   Steps of Creating a Trustworthy DODAG 
After creating the monitoring table, the BR creates the DODAG following the steps below:  
Step 1: BR introduces itself as a floating root. Thus, it has no parents. 
Step 2: (Calculating reliability): first, each node i evaluates the reliability of its neighboring node 
j at time t using Eq. (1) using three measures of energy, trust, and veracity of the monitoring 
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In Eq. (1), ( )ijR t  is between 0 and 1 (     [0,) 1](ijR t  ). 1 indicates complete reliability, and 0 
indicates non-reliability. 𝑤1 ،𝑤2 and 𝑤3 are the energy, trust, and veracity weights considered for 
reliability. These weights depend on the context and are defined by the network manager. Each 
element of the reliability values  Energy,Veracity,Trust    x   is evaluated considering the 
monitoring table and according to Eq. (2); where, ∆𝑡 is the reliability updating interval; 
    [0,1]  indicates that evaluating reliability relies on direct or older observations. It was 
suggested that the nodes store their old observations in TPM.  
 
x,direct x( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )xij ij ijR t R t R t t = + − −  
(2) 
 
When node i receives DIO messages from its neighbors, it calculates the new reliability for each 
neighboring node j. The new reliability is the mean of the reliability values calculated using Eq. 
(1). Moreover, each node transmits the reliability to its neighbors via the DIO message. The 
obtained result shows the ultimate reliability for the neighboring node j, and it is used to select 















In Eq. (3),    , (            )  k i neighbors of i neighbors of j   and m represents the number of the 
nodes from which the node i has received the reliability value of its neighboring node j.  
Third, using Eq. (4), the node i calculates its new reliability, which is the mean value of all 
















In Eq. (4),         k neighbors of i  and n represents the number of neighboring nodes from which 
the node i has received its reliability value.   
Step 3 (Calculating the route cost based on reliability): each node i calculates the route cost 
for each accessible neighbor j. This cost represents the cost of the route from node i to BR via 
node j regardless of the reliability measure. The route cost is )(j FinalR , which is calculated 
using Eq. (3). The route, including nodes with higher reliability values, is selected. However, the 
route, including trustless nodes, should be avoided. Therefore, the selected route might be the 
longest but the most secure one. 
Step 4 (Selecting parents): After calculating the reliability values for all candidate neighbors, 
the node i selects a set of parents that satisfy the constraint (nodes with reliability values greater 
than or equal to the threshold are selected. The system manager determines the threshold). The 
best reliable node is selected as the parent—the node i selects the node with the lowest rank as 
the parent among candidates with the same reliability. 
Step 5 (Calculating rank of each node): The rank of each node of the graph should decrease 
uniformly while moving up towards the BR, and it should increase uniformly while moving 
down towards the leaf nodes. Also, it should be limited to MIN-H4 and MAX-H5 [2]. Therefore, 
the BR sets its value to MAX-H to meet the rank uniformity. Each node calculates its N ranks 
R(N) using the total parent rank R(P) selected in step 4, and the reliability of the selected parent 
is calculated using Eq. (5). 
 
  





4 Min Hop Rank increase 
5 Ma Hop Rank Increase 
Step 6: When a node calculates its reliability value, it selects its parent and calculates its rank. It 
updates the records, including its measures (reliability values of itself and its neighbors), and 
transmits its DIO to the neighboring nodes.   
Step 7: Routing and transmitting the routing table to the neighboring nodes via the DIO message 
upon receiving the message.  
An example of a DODAG graph is given in Figure 4. 
 
FIGURE 4 An example of a DODAG graph created by the proposed method. 
 
3.3   Phase 2: Detecting Sinkhole in DSH-RPL 
In the proposed DSH-RPL method, it is assumed that an IoT network has no malicious nodes while 
being established. A DODAG graph is created in the first phase using trustworthy nodes with high 
reliability. As the network continues operation and new nodes are added to the graph, an attack 
might occur. In the proposed method, the presence of a sinkhole node is checked before data 
transmission. 
 
3.3.1   Detecting Malicious Nodes based on Rank 
In this method, the correct routing table of each node is broadcast in the established network before 
the sinkhole attacks. In the first step, two characteristics are defined for detecting abnormal DIO 
messages: 
Differences in node rank with parent (DNR-P): this characteristic is the difference in the rank of 
the node with its parent, which is calculated according to Eq. (6). The value of this characteristic is 
obtained when the routing table is constructed or updated. 
  ( ) ( )_ _DNR P parent rank node rank− = −  (6) 
 
 
FIGURE 5 The presence of sinkhole attack in the network. 
 
For example, according to Figure (5), DNR-P of node N5 is 1, because its rank in the graph is 3. 
While its parent rank, N3, is 2. Therefore, DNR-P of N5 is 2 3 1− = .  
The next characteristic is the difference between the source node and the node itself (DSN-NI): 
this characteristic is the difference between the source node transmitting the message and the node 
itself as in Eq. (7).  
 
  ( ) ( )Message sender node _rankDSN NI node rank− = −  (7) 
 
For example, in Figure (5), N5 receives the message from N3, and N5 calculates DNS-NI. Since the 
rank of the node transmitting the DIO message (N3) is 2, DSN-NI would be 1. The rank of the 
transmitter node is 2, and the rank of the node itself is 3, 2 3 1− = . 
However, in Figure (5), when the sinkhole node penetrates the network, it announces its rank zero 
for DIO messages to introduce itself as the root node and transmit it to all children nodes. When N5 
receives a DIO message from the malicious node (N3), it should calculate DSN-NI, which would be 
3. Because the rank of the source node is zero, and the rank of N5 is 3. Therefore, DSN-NI in Figure 
(5) is 0 3 3− = . 
The DSH-RPL method considers the DIO message as a malicious node if DSN-NI>DNR-P. In 
Figure (5), the DIO message transmitted by the malicious node (N3) is detected as a malicious 
message by N5 using DSN-NI>DNR-P and informs the root node via a control message. 
The proposed method applies another operation on the route, including a node suspicious as a 
sinkhole node to ensure that a node is malicious. 
 
3.3.2   Detecting the Malicious Node based on PDR 
In the second step, the packet delivery rate (PDR) is used to ensure the detection of the sinkhole 
node. PDR represents the ratio of the packets delivered successfully to the number of packets 
transmitted by the transmitter node. A transmitter node confirms that a packet is transmitted 
successfully when it receives an ACK packet from the receiver node. To this end, after receiving the 
warning message, the root node transmits several control messages called RPL-MC to the leaf nodes 
of the route with suspicious nodes. This message includes the destination address via the route of 
interest (Base). Figure 6 shows the Format of RPL-MC message. 
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FIGURE 6 Format of RPL-MC message 
Upon receiving RPL-MC, the nodes should transmit an ACK message to the root node. When a 
sinkhole node exists along the route, all or some of the messages are discarded and not transmitted to 
the destination by receiving the RPL-MC message. This can be understood using PDR. 
PDR can be calculated by comparing the number of RPL-MC packets with the number of received 
ACK packets. Therefore, the average PDR is calculating using Eq. (8). 
 
  
Number of ACKs received from the destination
Number of RPL-MC packets sent
PDR
 








In the proposed method, a statistical method is used to determine abnormal conditions and the 
presence of sinkhole node in the network through defining a threshold value (PDRT). In this method, 
a lower threshold limit and an upper threshold limit called LT-P and UT-P, respectively, are 
considered, and the average PDR is calculated using Eq. (8). PDRA is calculated, and a normal 
distribution of the threshold is obtained using Eq. (9) by calculating the standard deviation.   
 
  T APDR PDR SD= −  (9) 
 
The values that exceed the interval between LT-P and UT-P are determined as abnormal values. 
Considering Eq. (9), if the PDR value of the route with a suspicious node is lower than PDRT, PDR 
is lower than the expected value based on the received ACKs. Thus, there exists a sinkhole node 
along the route, which is not allowed to transmit packets to the other nodes and these packets are 
discarded by the sinkhole node. Therefore, the malicious node should be omitted from the routing 
operation. This problem is studied in the third phase. 
 
3.4   Phase 3: Quarantining the Malicious Node in DSH-RPL 
In this phase, the sinkhole node is quarantined after detection and isolated from other nodes, so that 
routing and data transmission is not interrupted. To this end, the root node, which is aware of the 
sinkhole attack and has received the number of the sinkhole node, generates a warning message and 
transmits it to all nodes of its graph. Also, this node quarantines the adversary node. The primary 
information broadcast by the message transmitted from the root node to the other nodes, includes the 
rank of the malicious node that allows other nodes to reorganize themselves. Therefore, the 
malicious node is isolated from the network, and the connected nodes are reorganized to create a 
new graph, in which there is no sinkhole node.   
3.5   Phase 4: Data Transmission based on Encryption 
Encryption is used to prevent illegal access, and ensure secure information transmission. Encryption 
is the process of converting information or data to code. The new security factor and the functions 
used to simulate the performance of the encryption strategies are discussed in this section. The 
Homomorphic Encryption (HE) technique is used to execute data security. Encrypting means that an 
encryption hash function is executed using an encryption algorithm. The encrypted data is 
transmitted to the final device, and the data is decoded, and their reliability is validated.   
 
3.5.1   Employing HE 
HE is an encryption method that allows various specific computations to be applied to the encrypted 
data and obtain an encrypted text. The receiver might decode the encrypted text and obtain the 
aggregated data without knowing the primary data. Therefore, this method is suitable for 
transmitting objects to the root in DODAG. This encryption method provides the possibility of 
applying computations to the encrypted data. The HE processes include 4 functions:  
 Key generation: the transmitter generates a public key ( kP ) and a secret key ( kS ) for encrypting 
the primary text.  
 Encryption: using the secret key ( kS ), the transmitter encrypts the simple text ( sT ) and creates s
kS  ( sT ). The encrypted text ( eT  ) and the public key are transmitted to the receiver. 
 Evaluation: The receiver has a function f to evaluate the encrypted text, and this function is 
applied using kP  to perform the decoding operation.   
 Decoding: The text TE received by the receiver is decoded using the secret key ( kS ), and the 
result is obtained. 
Therefore, the data transmission from the objects to the root and vice versa is performed by HE 
encryption in the routes without malicious nodes. HE process is an encryption strategy in which the 
process can be done by the users themselves. The primary message is restored using the secret key, 
and the messages are converted in the nodes using public and secret keys. The flowchart of the 
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FIGURE 7 Flowchart of the proposed DSH-RPL method 
 
4   PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
This section analyzes security parameters and evaluates the qualitative performance in the form of 
numerical results to validate the performance of the proposed DSH-RPL method. To demonstrate a 
feasibility study, the performance analysis of DSH-RPL has been divided into three parts: 
1) Detection Rate (DR), 
2) False Negative Rate (FNR),  
3) False Positive Rate (FPR),  
4) Packet Delivery Rate (PDR) 
 
4.1   PERFORMANCE METRICS 
The proposed DSH-RPL method has been simulated and its performance evaluated in Network 
Simulator version 2 (NS-2) running on Linux Ubuntu 14.03 LTS. The results were compared with both 
methods (SecTrust-RPL [1] and IBOOS-RPL [3]). 
B 
Data collection by the objects 
The BR transmits a warning message containing ID of the malicious node to all nodes 
Isolating the malicious node from the network and reorganizing the nodes  
Transmitting data to BR using HE 
BR receives response from the server and transmits to the object of interest via HE encryption 





DR: Ratio of sinkhole nodes to total malicious nodes that were correctly diagnosed as a sinkhole 















FPR: The FPR is determined by the total number of nodes mistakenly found as the malevolent nodes 

















                         
(11) 
 
FNR: The rate of the malevolent node to total normal nodes incorrectly signed as a normal node [21-




















PDR: This criterion represents the rate of packets that were successfully delivered to the destination 


























4.2   SIMULATION RESULT 
All three methods are evaluated according to Table 1 under four scenarios. Table 2 displays the 
significant parameters used in the simulation. 
TABLE 1: Parameters used. 
Parameters Value 
Operating System Linux Ubuntu 
IP version IPV6 
Protocol RPL 
Simulation time 1000 second 
Number of nodes 500 
Type of attacks Sinkhole  
Average transaction size 77 Byte 
 




TABLE 2 Parameters used for four scenarios. 
Scenario #1 Scenario #2 
Sinkhole rate 10% Sinkhole rate 20% 
Topology (m x m) 300*300 Topology (m x m) 300*300 
Time 1000 Time 1000 
Scenario #3 Scenario #4 
Sinkhole rate 30% Attack interval 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, 3.5 
Topology (m x m) 300*300 Topology (m x m) 300*300 
Time 1000 Time 1000 
 
TABLE 3 DR vs Attack interval 
(30% attack) 







 0.5 62 70 86 
 1 63 71 88 
 1.5 66 72 91 
 2 69 74 92 
 2.5 72 77 93 
 3 72 78 94 
 3.5 74 81 96 
 
TABLE 4 FNR vs Attack interval 
(30% attack) 







 0.5 15.5 12.4 7.2 
 1 17.8 13.3 7.65 
 1.5 17.3 14.8 7.8 
 2 18.67 15.4 8.5 
 2.5 18.8 15.7 9.5 
 3 19.4 14.7 9.8 
 3.5 21.6 15.6 10.98 
 
TABLE 5 FPR vs Attack interval 
(30% attack) 







 0.5 23.6 18.5 10.4 
 1 24.7 19.8 11.3 
 1.5 24.5 20.9 12.8 
 2 25.1 20.67 12.4 
 2.5 25.3 20.8 12.7 
 3 26.5 21.4 13.2 
 3.5 27.1 23.6 13.6 
 
TABLE 6 PDR vs Attack interval 
(30% attack) 







 0.5 66 74 82 
 1 67 75 84 
 1.5 68 76 87 
 2 69 77 89 
 2.5 72 79 90 
 3 73 80 93 
 3.5 75 82 98 
DR: Figure 8 shows the DR in all three scenarios. As can be seen in diagrams A to C, in all 
simulated scenarios, the proposed DSH-RPL method has a higher detection rate compared to 
IBOOS-RPL, and SecTrust-RPL, because in the proposed method, the malicious sinkhole nodes are 
detected in two steps using precise evaluations. In most of the previous methods like IBOOS-RPL, 
and SecTrust-RPL, only one examination is made to detect the malicious sinkhole node, and the 
node is considered as malicious only with a straightforward validation step. However, in the 
proposed method, the nodes are first examined in terms of their rank, such that the difference 
between the rank of the transmitter node and the receiver node is examined; if 𝑃 DSN − NI, the node 
is considered as malicious. Second, another examination is made in terms of packet delivery rate for 
more precise detection of the malicious node. In other words, it examines the number of transmitted 
control packets to detect the sinkhole node precisely. These factors increase the DR of the proposed 
DSH-RPL method compared to SecTrust-RPL and IBOOS-RPL by 26% and 31%, respectively, and 
it is higher than the other two methods in all three diagrams.  
 
FIGURE 8 Number of Nodes vs DR. 
 
FNR: The results of the FNR criterion are given in all three scenarios as shown in Figure 9. This 
measure represents the number of nodes that are not malicious, but they are incorrectly detected as 
malicious nodes. According to the information obtained from simulation, as can be seen in 
diagrams A to C, FNR of the proposed method is less than IBOOS-RPL and SecTrust-RPL, 
because the proposed DSH-RPL performs a complete two-step examination to detect the malicious 
(a): 10% attack 
 
 
(b): 20% attack 
 
 
(c): 30% attack 
 
sinkhole nodes, and the decision is not made only based on one factor. In the SecTrust method, the 
trust between the direct and the indirect nodes is examined to detect the malicious node. In the 
proposed DSH-RPL method, a precise two-step examination is made to detect the malicious 
sinkhole nodes; in the first step, the malicious node is detected based on the nodes' rank. In the 
second step, the control packets are transmitted to the suspicious nodes, and the average PDR is 
calculated upon receiving an ACK. PDR is used to detect and quarantine the sinkhole node. As a 
result of this two-step investigation, the proposed DSH-RPL has less FNR compared to the other 
two methods, such that it is improved by 16.1% and 22.78% compared to the SecTrust-RPL and 
IBOOS-RPL respectively.  
FIGURE 9 Number of Nodes vs FNR. 
FPR: Figure 10 shows the FPR in all three scenarios. This measure represents the percentage of the 
malicious nodes that are not detected. According to diagrams A to C, the proposed DSH-RPL has 
less FPR than the other two methods. FPR of the IBOOS-RPL is higher than the other two methods, 
because it makes a superficial comparison to detect malicious activities. Therefore, many of the 
malicious nodes are not detected correctly. However, in the proposed DSH-RPL method, the 
malicious node is detected in two steps. First, the nodes that have not transmitted their rank correctly 
are detected as malicious nodes using the information of the node recorded while creating a reliable 
DODAG in each node. However, for more reliability and more precise detection of the malicious 
node, the proposed method examines the PDR along the routes with suspicious nodes to precisely 
detect the malicious nodes. These two steps, along with each other and the information inserted in 
(a): 10% attack 
 
 
(b): 20% attack 
 
 
(c): 30% attack 
 
each node while generating a reliable DODAG, reduces the FPR of the proposed DSH-RPL 
compared to the other two methods in all scenarios. FPR of the DSH-RPL is improved by 18.2% and 
23.1% compared to SecTrust-RPL and IBOOS-RPL.  
FIGURE 10 Number of Nodes vs FPR . 
 
PDR: The results of the PDR criterion are given in all three scenarios as shown in Figure 11. As can 
be seen in the diagrams of different scenarios, on average, the proposed DSH-RPL is improved by 
19.68% and 25.32% compared to SecTrust-RPL and IBOOS-RPL, respectively. The PDR 
improvement in the proposed method is because it employs a reliable node to generate DODAG 
such that the reliability of the nodes is examined, and the nodes are evaluated based on their 
reliability in packet transmission. Also, the proposed method detects the malicious sinkhole nodes in 
two steps and isolates them from the network to avoid interrupting the data transmission. The 
proposed DSH-RPL also encrypts data to increase the reliability of data transmission. The proposed 
method transmits data using homomorphic encryption; thus, if a malicious node aims to destruct 
data, it cannot succeed. All these factors increase the PDR of the proposed DSH-RPL method 






(a): 10% attack 
 
 
(b): 20% attack 
 
 




FIGURE 11 Number of Nodes vs PDR. 
 
 
5   CONCLUSION 
The IoT ecosystem operates in an entirely distributed environment with a low delay so that the devices 
can communicate with each other securely and exchange time-sensitive data. In this paper, 
homomorphic encryption is used to encrypt data; thus, the data is transmitted from objects to the root 
and vice versa using HE encryption along the routes free of malicious nodes. HE encryption is an 
encryption strategy in which processing can be carried out by the users. The main message is restored 
using the private key, and the messages are transformed into the nodes using the public and private keys. 
The proposed DSH-RPL is implemented in several IoT scenarios. The security requirements and an 
attack model are defined to evaluate the efficiency of the DSH-RPL and its capability to realize these 
requirements. The simulation results show that the DSH-RPL improves the false-positive, false-
negative, packet-delivery rate, and detection rate, significantly. This capability of DSH-RPL provides 
the possibility of secure data transmission among IoT devices. 
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